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I. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM
1. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."'
2. "[I]t shall be a base and vile thing to plead for money and re-
ward
,2
3. Cartoon: Lawyer says to client sitting in his office: "You have a
pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can you afford?" 3
Q. What is a thousand lawyers at the bottom of the ocean?
A. A good start."
Although they occurred at vastly different time periods and come
from radically different sources, all three of the items above are con-
nected. The first statement was made by Justice Black, writing for the
majority in Griffin v. Illinois4 which held that the state could not condi-
tion access to an appeal of a conviction for a crime on the defendant's
ability to pay for a transcript to effect the appeal.
The second statement, which may surprise many readers, is from a
statute that existed in the colony of Carolina before America became an
independent nation.5 Similar to the law in the other colonies, this stat-
ute prohibited persons from setting themselves up in the business of
rendering legal advice for financial compensation.
Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. B.A.,
City College of New York, 1956; LL.B., Columbia University, 1961. The author wishes to
thank his colleague, Professor Cliff Fishman, who also teaches criminal law and Ms. Gail
Gerebenics who left him the benefit of her experience as a defense counsel.
1. Griffin v. Iii., 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2. FRANCIS M. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 19 (Greenwood Press 1969) (1951).
3. ALFRED A. KNOPF, in THE NEW YORKER BOOK OF LAWYER CARTOONS 73 (1993).
4. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. See HELLER, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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The third statement provides two examples of current anti-lawyer
"jokes" which either question the relationship that lawyers have to jus-
tice or express disdain and hostility toward the legal profession in gen-
eral.6
What is the connection among these three items? The Griffin case
expresses one of the highest formal ideals of the law-all individuals are
equal before the law and the rendering of rights should not be arbitrar-
ily compromised by factors extraneous to justice, such as the wealth or
indigence of the person before the bar. The early American colonists
expressed the same notion in another vein-it was dishonorable and
exploitative to make a profit from assisting an individual to pursue his
or her rights under the law. It is my speculation that one factor that
drives the public antipathy toward the legal profession-as expressed in
the "jokes"-is the view that lawyers are indifferent to the real-life con-
sequences of their representation. Lawyers are viewed as ambulance-
chasing, wily deceptors, who are solely interested in "selling" legal
cover to the highest bidder.7
No area of the law illustrates more the actual and perceived failure
to ensure equal justice and serve the public interest by providing access
to lawyers than the field of criminal representation. The distance be-
tween the quality of representation that a wealthy person (or corpora-
tion) receives in a criminal case and that received by an indigent person
is scandalous. One need only contrast the careful, meticulous, success-
ful representation that any number of high profile, wealthy defendants
6. See KNOPF, supra note 3.
7. William McDonald notes that "anti-lawyer sentiments have been a recurring and
virulent theme in the Western experience," dating back to the 13th Century. William R.
McDonald, In Defense of Inequality, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 13, 19 (William F. McDon-
ald ed., 1983). He notes that it was not accidental that Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), which extended the right to counsel to poor defendants in criminal cases, was decided
during an economic depression. McDonald argues that this case served to counter the eco-
nomically-destabilized public's perception that lawyers operated solely as an "agent of the
ruling class." McDonald supra at 19.
8. See Tom Kenworthy & John Jetter, At the Emotional Epicenter, Cheers, Tears and...
Shopping, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at A33. O.J. Simpson was found liable in a subsequent
civil trial alleging wrongful death, and evaluations were subsequently made that the outcome
of his criminal trial was due to clever, manipulative lawyering by the criminal defense team
and an abundance of financial resources. Id. See Lorraine Adams & Serge F. Kovaleski, The
Dream Team's Resources, in POSTMORTEM 126 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996) (quoting Alan
M. Dershowitz, one of Simpson's defense counsel, who stated that, "Money meant every-
thing in this case"). William Kennedy Smith, the nephew of Senator Ted Kennedy, (D.-
Mass.), was acquitted of rape in 1991. After a ten day trial, a jury deliberated less than sev-
enty-seven minutes before returning a verdict of not guilty. Renee Loth, 1991: Year of the
Paper Tiger, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1991, at 57. Smith spent $1,000,000 on his defense.
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have had with the consistent reports of the overburdened and under-
funded public defender and assigned counsel programs for indigents9 to
see that we are failing to provide equal protection of the law to all indi-
viduals. The problem is vividly illustrated in the arena of criminal law,
where a failure of equal protection has the most dire consequence-the
administration of capital punishment. No wealthy defendant has ever
been executed by governmental authorities in American history.'0 The
Mafia is reputed to be a criminal organization that has arranged many
assassinations. However, this author could not find an instance in which
any member of the Mafia received the death penalty. The members of
this organization also qualify as "wealthy" due to the vast resources of
their many criminal enterprises. It is not that wealthy people
(especially mob figures) have not committed crimes that are indistin-
guishable from the crimes for which many poor or non-wealthy people
have been executed.1 It is simply that the wealthy defendants had the
Charles Babington, The Uncivil Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at Cl. For an account of the
wealthy defendants who received receiving lesser sentences despite conviction, see The
Money Factor-The Rich and Famous in Court, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1995, at All.
9. For a description of under-funded public defenders programs, see Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 68 IND. LJ. 363,364,390 (1993).
10. Congressman Clay asserts that the answer to the question of whether "At least one
rich person convicted of first degree murder in the United States has been executed?" is
"no." WILLIAM S. CLAY SR., To KILL OR NOT To KILL; THOUGHTS ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 117-18 (Michael & Mary Burgess eds., 1990). Representative Clay, however,
provides no citation for the statement. One of his staff members stated that the book had
been published 6 years earlier and that the "data collection ... was not now available for re-
view."
This author queried Criminal Law faculty members and practitioners handling death
penalty cases as to whether they had any information that would contradict the statement
made above. With one exception, those who responded said that they believed that the
statement was accurate. One person suggested reading Murder in Coweta County. The book
is the account of an individual from a family that reputedly made a fortune in the manufac-
ture of illegal whisky who received the death penalty for murder. At the time of the individ-
ual's trial for the violation of Internal Revenue laws, his lawyers claimed he was without
funds and filed "a pauper's plea." MURDER IN COWETA COUNTY 261 (1969).
Professor Steve Russell, one of the responding Criminal Law faculty, suggested that
"wealthy" in this context should mean having the capacity to put on a defense without regard
to cost: a defendant who could afford to hire jury consultants, experts, investigators, experi-
enced criminal lawyers who charge the highest fees, and who could afford collateral costs,
like daily transcripts for cross-examination purposes. In short, the kind of defense that was
available to O.J. Simpson. See also Charles Judson, et al, A Study of the California Penalty
Jury in First Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969) (finding substantial class
bias in death sentencing).
11. "Indistinguishable" or worse: Richard A. Loeb and Nathan F. Leopold, two young
men from wealthy Chicago families, kidnapped and murdered a fourteen year old boy solely
for the thrill of being able to outwit the authorities: They had killed Robert Franks, because
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financial resources to purchase the kind of defense that can blunt a
prosecution for a capital crime or dissuade a prosecutor from even pur-
suing such a penalty. 2 Lawyers versed in the defense of capital cases
regularly report that poverty and the failure of adequate defense are the
key variables that determine whether the death penalty is imposed or
actually carried out. 3
they wanted the excitement of committing a perfect, detection-defying crime.
MAUREEN MCKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB 22
(Notable Trials Library 1989).
12. It is sometimes speculated that the wealthy defendant escapes even the pursuit of
the death penalty by the prosecutor because of a by-product of great wealth-namely, celeb-
rity status or prior public reputation for "respectability" that is easily projected in the media
before a jury is chosen. See Shirley E. Perlman, O.J. Won't Face Death Penalty, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 10, 1994, at A6 (reporting that Los Angeles prosecutors decided not to seek the death
penalty after a pre-trial run with a mock jury indicated that it would make securing a convic-
tion more difficult). Lawyers active in capital punishment litigation believe that the prosecu-
tor must be able to render a defendant "faceless," and thus less human, in order to convince
a jury to impose the death penalty. A classic example of this speculation is presented by the
case of two young persons, described as coming from "affluent" homes, who were charged
with first degree murder of their newborn son. The prosecutor, initially announced that he
would seek the death penalty. The defense attorney mounted a pre-trial publicity campaign
to get the public to protest, and within a week the prosecutor was reported to be
"reassessing" the demand for the death penalty. See Karl Vick, "Young Love and a Dead
Baby Tear at the Heart of Delaware," WASH. POST, November 22, 1996, at Al, col. 4. De-
fense counsel is quoted as saying: "What has happened in the last several days is that Brian
[one of the two young persons], the individual, the human being, the nice, normal kid, has
been displayed." Id. at A22.
One commentator has noted, "because of the greater procedural safeguards in capital
cases and the necessity of resolving additional complex issue, death penalty cases take days
and sometimes weeks longer than other cases." Roy B. Herron, Defending Life in Tennessee
Death Penalty Cases, 51 TENN. L. REV. 681, 697 n.104 (1984). High-powered, well-paid
counsel are in an even better position to exploit this complexity because they have virtually
unlimited resources, and the prosecutor is often aware of this.
Occasionally, such as the murder trial of Erik and Lyle Menendez, a prosecutor will ig-
nore these obstacles and seek the death penalty against a wealthy defendant. The Menendez
case is typical of those that produce such a result. The defendants were charged with the
first-degree murder of their parents, which was allegedly committed in order to gain access to
their parents' wealth. The prosecutor ultimately achieved a conviction, but did not succeed
in getting the death penalty. See Anne Burke, Menendez Riches Took Huge Cut, Sources
Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 27, 1996, at B2 (The first trials of the Menendez brothers cost
$2 million dollars and ended in hung juries). See also Menendez Brothers Get Life Terms, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 18, 1996, at 1A. During the second trials the brothers were
convicted of first-degree murder, but the jury refused to impose the death penalty. Id.
13. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). Bright writes:
Poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the
skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters. This fact is con-
firmed in case after case. It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of the legal
representation that distinguishes this case, where the death penalty was imposed,
from many similar cases, where it was not.
ALL DEFENDANTS, RICH AND POOR
The current structure of criminal representation jeopardizes equal
protection of the law for indigents. Additionally, and most egregiously,
serious questions remain as to whether even more injustice is done to
lower-middle and middle-class defendants. Under current law, in all
felony cases and some misdemeanor cases, a defendant who is clearly
"indigent" has an absolute right to counsel at the state's expense. 14 The
state may also have to provide such a defendant some expert assistance
after that defendant has met certain conditions demonstrating need. 5
Although the classification of "indigent" is clearly a question of federal
constitutional import, it has not been fully developed by the United
States Supreme Court.6 Thus, jurisdictions have adopted varying stan-
dards with, as Justice Powell has bemoaned, the "inequitable" result
that a defendant denied appointment of counsel in one jurisdiction
might have qualified in another." There is some evidence that some ju-
risdictions impose very high barriers to finding a defendant "indigent."
This forces those who do not qualify as indigent to proceed without any
representation." Moreover, defendants who have some funds, but not
Id.
14. Id. at 1836; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
15. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that upon a preliminary showing of
need, the State has an obligation to provide an expert in psychiatry to enable an indigent de-
fendant to assert an insanity defense); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. 1 (1985)
(noting that the Court expressly reserves question of whether an indigent must be supplied
other forms of expert assistance, such as a ballistics or fingerprint expert).
16. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion in Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277,
289 (1964) (joined by Justices Warren, Brennan, and Stewart) discussed, in dicta, the concept
of indigence for purposes of appointment of counsel. Justice Goldberg argued against limit-
ing appointment of counsel only to defendants who presented a picture of total poverty. Jus-
tice Goldberg thought that the court should consider the cost of retaining private counsel in
the particular case against the totality of the defendant's assets, income, and special obliga-
tions. In other words, the issue would not be solely "indigence" per se, but whether the de-
fendant would be financially unable to retain counsel. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
17. Justice Powell concurring in Argersinger: "The line between indigency and assumed
capacity to pay for counsel is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from State to
State and often resulting in serious inequities to accused persons." 407 U.S. at 50 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
18. One study has shown that some courts consider a defendant to be eligible for a
court-appointed attorney only if he or she has not been able to meet bail or has an income
below some arbitrarily chosen level. See SHELDON KRANTZ ET. AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 309-347 (1976). See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 187 (3d. ed. 1992).
Some courts have refused to treat a defendant as eligible for appointed counsel despite
the fact that the defendant may be involved in bankruptcy proceedings that block his or her
having access to funds for retaining counsel in a criminal case. See Craig Peyton Gaumer &
Paul R. Griffith, Presumed Indigent The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Debtor's Sixth Amend-
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sufficient funds to pay for a full-scale defense, are worse off than indi-
gent persons who get resort to the full attention of a public defender.'9
The Catch-22 which makes the problem even worse is that the issue will
likely remain suppressed because most middle-class defendants may not
be able to afford extensive appellate activity that may be necessary to
raise the question of the proper scope of "indigency."
II. THE STRAIGHTFORWARD PROPOSED SOLUTION
A just resolution to the problem of unequal access might be ad-
vanced by what may at first seem like a radical solution. It is proposed
that the state and federal government should adopt legislation that re-
quires that all defendants-the wealthy, the middle-class, and the
poor-will be represented by counsel that is appointed and paid for by
the courts.
A host of problems could be solved by such a restructuring of crimi-
nal representation. First and foremost, it is the most thorough and
complete means of ensuring both the actuality and the appearance of
equal justice. Under such an arrangement defendants would no longer
be able to avoid conviction or have their penalties softened solely be-
cause they "purchased" such an outcome.
The appearance of justice may be almost as important as the sub-
stance of justice because the law functions better in an environment of
high public confidence. If the general public trusts the criminal justice
system, there will be less resort to vigilantism or dangerous forms of
"self-help." The public will be more amenable to requests for addi-
tional public funding of criminal justice institutions if they believe that
those institutions function in a fair manner. There should now be in-
creased concern over the public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
ment Right to Criminal Defense Counsel, 62 UMKC L. REV. 277 (1994).
In 1973, F. William McCalpin, Chairman of the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, commented that 70% of the population earned be-
tween $5,000 and $15,000, but "[t]hey do not qualify for free legal services and yet their
means frequently do not permit ready access to private lawyers in times of need." KRANTZ,
supra note 18, at 294 (quotation omitted).
19. Another anomaly results from our current "indigent-only" appointed counsel sys-
tem. Justice Powell pointed out that working class or middle-class defendants may decide
that hiring counsel is an expense their families cannot afford when faced with minor charges
that potentially carry a jail sentence, but which they expect will result only in a fine. Ar-
gesinger, 407 U.S. at 50 (Powell, J., concurring). An indigent would get counsel appointed in
such cases. Id. If an indigent has no appointed counsel in such a case and the court then de-
cides to impose a jail sentence, the indigent has a right to reversal of the conviction. See Id.
No reversal is available for the non-indigent defendant who, attempting to protect family re-
sources, underestimates the need for counsel and thus receives a jail sentence.
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tem in the wake of the public opinion polls taken after the O.J. Simpson
trial. While the outcome in that case was laced with issues of race and
gender,'0 it is also clear that the public at large believes that defendants
can deeply (and unfairly) influence the outcome in a criminal case if
they have virtually unlimited resources to employ many high-powered
and specialized lawyer." The growing public awareness of, and suspi-
cion about, the inequities in our criminal justice system can only grow
with the increased exposure to the system through televised trials and
Court TV. The networks are now aware of the overwhelming public at-
tention to the O.J. Simpson trial and this will ensure that other rich and
famous defendants will capture our TV screens in the future. The
growing public distrust can only be addressed by dramatic changes.
Middle-class persons would benefit from such changes in a number
of ways. As noted above, some defendants who do not meet the strin-
gent standards for "indigency" and do not truly have the full resources
for a defense would get such a defense without having to jeopardize es-
sential family resources.'
Our society has stigmatized the labeled "poor" to connote not sim-
ply a lack of money-but also negative character traits, such as indo-
lence or a lack of self-responsibility. Some middle class persons in the
criminal justice system will deplete family resources in order to hire
counsel, thus avoiding the ignominy of asking for "welfare." A re-
quirement of appointment of counsel for all persons charged with a
crime avoids this expensive face-saving maneuver.
Moreover, the threat to essential family resources of the average
middle-class defendant is real. A person facing a serious criminal
charge is in an extremely weak bargaining position when confronted
with an attorney making fee demands. If the person is caught up in the
criminal justice system for the first time he or she has no prior experi-
ence to gauge the reasonableness of the fee demanded. Nor is that per-
son or her family likely to be emotionally prepared for bargaining over
the matter.
20. See Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and
Susan Smith-Spectacles of our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1996).
21. Simpson Case Raises Knowledge, But Increases Skepticism of Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, W. VA. LAW., Nov. 8 1994, at 17.
22. There may not be much sympathy for the defendant who has, in fact, committed a
crime. One may simply see the collateral costs of defense as a by-product that he or she
could avoid by abiding by the law. However, it is the resources of family members, who are
often wholly innocent of the crime for which the defendant is charged, who bear the cost of
counsel.
1997]
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In many instances middle-class persons will be more likely to suffer
the adverse consequences of a criminal conviction than either the poor
or the rich. Indigent criminal defendants are more likely to have no
steady employment or have access only to low level kinds of employ-
ment which a criminal conviction is less of a disqualifier.3 Moreover,
among young males in poor neighborhoods or among those individuals
in organized criminal syndicates, a criminal conviction may be a badge
of merit, a symbol of "toughness." Note also the anomaly that the truly
wealthy may obtain access to the best counsel despite the fact that after
a conviction, they frequently have resources for independent living or
they may have continuing social contacts who treat the criminal convic-
tion as if it were nothing.24 These conditions, which neutralize the nega-
tivity of a criminal conviction generally do not exist for middle-class
persons because their central means of support could be jeopardized by
certain kinds of criminal convictions. Furthermore, such persons are
much more vulnerable to the stigma and loss of status that can accom-
pany a criminal conviction.
The middle-class defendants, have the greatest incentive to avoid a
criminal conviction or to negotiate for the lightest penalty. They may,
be compelled to pay extremely costly attorney fees to achieve these
goals. Unlike the civil arena, which allows contingent fees, there are no
statutory or court controls on the fees that a criminal practitioner may
charger2 The self-assessment of fees by the attorneys tends to take into
account the defendants' assets. For example, Mike Tyson, the former
heavyweight champion, was charged $2 million for defense against a
rape charge-a charge of which he was ultimately convicted. A major
metropolitan newspaper placed the story of this fee arrangement on its
23. CRIME AND CAPITALISM 57-75 (David F. Greenberg ed., Temple Univ. Press 1993).
"Official Crime statistics demonstrate seemingly clear-cut relations between economic status
and crime. A high percentage of those arrested were unemployed at the time of arrest or
were employed irregularly at jobs with low pay." Id. at 63.
24. In a 1990 settlement with the SEC, Michael Milken pled guilty to "violations of se-
curities laws, paid more than $1 billion in fines and settlements and served two years in
prison." While SEC Watches, Milken and Ex-Accountant Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
1996, at 34. Although, according to the plea bargain, Milken is banned for life from the secu-
rities industry, he is working as a consultant for Bert C. Robert, CEO of MCI Communica-
tions, Rupert Murdoch, and, most notably, Ted Turner in a deal with Time-Warner. Id.
25. See United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit held
that the trial court had no power to reduce a fee of $8,000 in a criminal representation even
when the attorney disclosed that he spent only 40 hours on the case. Id. Therefore the trial
court's contempt finding against the lawyer for refusal to return a portion of the fee was re-
versed. Cf. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 22, § 603.7(e)(2) (1986) (setting maximum
fee in tort cases).
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front page-clearly confident that it would capture the attention of a
public that believes that lawyers financially exploit persons in trouble.2
There is no means for avoiding payment of the attorney fees be-
cause contingent fee arrangements-in which a defendant may avoid
the fee if he or she is convicted-are prohibited in criminal cases in all
jurisdictions.2 Furthermore, many private criminal law practitioners
require that the client pay a flat-fee for the entire case before any sub-
stantial work is done.28 One court has speculated that this kind of fee
arrangement provides the less than scrupulous attorney an incentive to
urge the defendant to plead guilty as a means of maximizing his profit.29
Note also that states have structured a one-way street for reim-
bursement of attorneys' fees. In Maryland, for example, an indigent de-
fendant who is convicted, can be made to pay the costs of his appointed
counsel if he should subsequently have the resources to do same.0 In
Maryland, and most jurisdictions, however, a defendant who is acquit-
ted has no claim against the state for reimbursement of counsel fees.3'
26. Bill Brubaker, For Tyson, Money Isn't In the Bank; Aides, Bills, Frills Drained Mil-
lions, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1992, at Al. These kind of news stories, indirectly disparaging
lawyers for outrageous fees, are common fare. See, e.g., Murray Kempton, The Wealthy Pay
for Acts of Mercy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 1994, at 43. Attorney Alan Dershowitz had repre-
sented the wealthy Leona Helmsley on appeal of her conviction for tax evasion, and had sued
her to recover his fee of "$27,245.67 for each of seven weeks." Id. Murray acknowledged
that the Dershowitz firm made the "generous concession that a clerical error had misled it
into a $330 overcharge." Id.
27. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COL. L. REV. 595
(1993).
28. One factor that encourages this practice is the fact that an attorney may be barred
from withdrawing from a case solely on the grounds that the client is not able to pay the rest
of his fee. See United States v. Gipson, 517 F. Supp. 230,231-32 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
29. See People v. Winkler, 523 N.E.2d 485, 487, 528 (N.Y. 1988). Some practitioners
allow an arrangement in which a retainer is paid and drawn on as the lawyer expends hours
on the case. These arrangements, however, are usually limited to defendants with substantial
assets such that the defense counsel is assured that he will be able to collect additional fees if
additional time is spent. See Peter Lushing, Criminal Law: The Fall and Rise of the Criminal
Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498,(1991).
30. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (1997); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163
(Michie 1995).
The American Bar Association (ABA) has opposed these State repayment schemes be-
cause they may have a chilling effect on the assertion of the right to counsel. In Fuller v. Ore-
gon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), the Court refused to sustain claims that state repayment schemes are
unconstitutional. There is still, however, legitimacy in the ABA's concern that, as a practical
matter, some persons may be dissuaded from asserting the right to have appointed counsel
for fear of the costs of reimbursement. Such an outcome, even occasionally, is undesirable in
policy terms.
31. One federal statute, The Independent Counsel Act, provides that a targeted gov-
ernment official will be reimbursed for attorney fees if an investigation does not result in an
1997]
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The innocent can never be totally immunized against the anxiety and
disruption in liberty that is entailed when one is subjected to criminal
charges because prosecutors are human beings who make errors, even
when they act in good faith. Supplying counsel to all defendants would
prevent the further injury of financial drain on an individual who is mis-
takenly subjected to prosecution.32
Two studies have also raised questions about whether middle-class
defendants who assume that they will receive superior representation
because they have paid an attorney is accurate.3  A study done in the
1960s demonstrated that retained counsel had a higher ratio of acquit-
tals in more counties than assigned counsel or the public defender who
represented indigents. They were, also, more frequently able to negoti-
ate probation or a plea of guilty to lesser offenses. 34 If these results
were modulated solely by the fact that some defendants had the money
to pay for higher quality representation-and thus "better" results
(better solely from the defendant's perspective)-it would be as objec-
tionable in equal justice terms as the better outcomes purchased by
wealthy defendants. However, the study speculated that the results may
be better explained by conditions of indigent defendants that flow from
their poverty, not the quality of representation.35 Indigent defendants
are more likely to be unemployed and unstable. Hence, they have less
access to probation or offers of pleas to lesser offenses. They may also
be less educated, which may cause them to commit crimes that are more
easily detected and proven.36 A more recent study of retained versus as-
indictment and the subject of the investigation would not normally have incurred the fees. 28
U.S.C. § 593 (f)(1) (1995). This occurrence is a rarity in the criminal law arena.
32. Naturally, it could be argued that an acquittal means only juridical innocence and
the freed party may have still committed the offense. It may simply be that the prosecutor
has not been able to meet the very high burden of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-to
support a conviction. However, there are instances in which the proof of the charged (or
convicted) person's innocence is established beyond all reasonable argument to the contrary
(i.e., DNA evidence that was not utilized at the time of trial), and even those individuals
have no claim from the state for attorney's fees.
33. One commentator has charged that some lawyers have attempted to covertly pres-
sure persons who are in doubt about paying the high cost of representation into believing
that "the practice of law is a confidence game," and that, unless they purchase some ma-
nipulation of the system, they will be treated harshly. See KRANTZ ET. AL., supra note 18, at
110 (quoting ABRAHAM BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE at 110 (1967).
34. LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS 21-27 (1965).
35. Id. at 25.
36. The same study also demonstrated, contrary to the speculation of the New York
court, that the defendants represented by retained counsel did not enter into guilty pleas
more frequently than assigned counsel or the public defender. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note
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signed counsel demonstrated no overall differences in results.3 There-
fore, under the proposal made in this Article, middle-class defendants
would not receive representation of a lesser quality if represented by
the public defender.
Another advantage of state-supplied representation for all defen-
dants is that the financial incentive for defense counsel to unethically or
illegally assist the client to escape conviction or to be a part of the cli-
ent's continuing criminal activity would be totally removed. One can
agree with Peter Lushing that the popular folklore-particularly within
the prosecutor's bar-that views all private criminal practitioners as an
ethically suspect group, paints with too broad a brush. 8 It may be a
failure to clearly separate the defense counsel from his (often guilty)
client. However, lawyers have been charged with engaging in criminal
activity to subvert prosecution of clients who have paid and retained
them." A Presidential Commission report demonstrates that a long-
34, at 21. This may, however, be consonant with the study's speculation about a higher per-
centage of jailed indigent defendants being associated more with their poverty than the
quality of their representation. As noted above the crimes committed by indigents may be
less sophisticated and more easily proven. Indigents may actually commit more crime be-
cause they face greater need. They are less likely to meet bail, and therefore, may as a prac-
tical matter plead guilty to minor offenses (even if innocent) if offered "time served" as the
punishment. Establishing innocence at a formal trial may be more difficult for indigents. If
they cannot make bail, they have to come to trial in prison garb, thus being unable to estab-
lish a "clean" citizen's look for the jury. Even if they have an alibi, they are less likely to
have access to "respectable" middle class witnesses to prove it.
37. Joyce Sterling, Retained Counsel Versus The Public Defender, in THE DEFENSE
COUNSEL 151 (William F. McDonald ed., 1983).
38. See Lushing, supra note 29, at 528. It is common knowledge, however, that prestig-
ious law firms do not generally engage in full scale representation of individuals (as opposed
to corporations) charged with crime, despite the fact that very substantial fees may be earned
in such representation. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE -LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 26 (noting the disdain of corporate lawyers for
criminal practitioners). Auerbach notes that in the early 1900s, some of this was a snobbish
reaction to the non-elite,'immigrant ethnics who practiced criminal law. However, the prac-
tice persists today. Is it possible that such firms do not want to associate with a class of cli-
ents who may have the potential of pressuring their attorney into unethical behavior as a
concomitant of the high fee?
39. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (lawyer for the labor racketeer,
Jimmy Hoffa, convicted of attempting to bribe a juror on Hoffa's behalf); In re Doe, 662 F.2d
1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1981) (lawyer allegedly advised client to lie during trial and to bribe wit-
nesses and had attempted to procure other false testimony); People v. Sanders, 436 N.E.2d
480 (N.Y. 1982) (attorney allegedly influenced the outcome of a case for profit); People v.
Salko, 391 N.E.2d 976, 980 (N.Y. 1979) (lawyer charged with crimes of bribery and bribing a
witness); see Ronald Goldstock & Steven Chananie, Criminal lawyers: The Use of Electronic
Surveillance and Search Warrants in the Investigation and Prosecution of Attorneys Suspected
of Criminal Wrongdoing, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1855, 1858 n.20 (1988) (listing a series of crimi-
nal convictions of lawyers and indicating that they are not "isolated" cases).
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term fee-based relationship was necessary in order to have regular ac-
cess to a group of attorneys who abused their office in order to improp-
erly insulate organized crime elements from prosecution.4° One major
form of abuse is that the organized crime figures, who are not on trial,
pay the attorney's fee on behalf of an indicted member. Then that at-
torney conducts the defense so as to protect the absent organized crime
figures from any exposure.4' The historical record also suggests that the
prospect of financial profit from the client is a pre-condition for attor-
neys engaging in illegal conduct to subvert the legal process. I could
find no cases in which an attorney was convicted of criminal corruption
of the legal process when acting as an assigned counsel or a public de-
fender. The fact that the clients have no financial leverage over as-
signed counsel or the public defender must play a role in this absence of
illegal behavior.42
40. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 29-31, 221-48 (1986).
The report documents five case studies of the long-term employment of lawyers by organized
criminal syndicates. Through wiretaps or compelled immunized testimony after an attorney
had been convicted, the report shows lawyers who suborned perjury, used their access to
grand jury witness lists to identify informers for purposes of assassination, and provided the
legal assistance to purchase banks, with undisclosed principals, which were then used to
launder the proceeds from crime. ItL at 221-48.
41. See United State v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding a conflict
of interest when a lawyer was paid by an unindicted crime figure, and the lawyer exaggerated
the role of the defendant to protect); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987)
(lawyer advised one party to commit criminal contempt and refuse to give evidence after
immunity from the prosecution was granted in order to avoid incrimination of a third party).
The problem is also presented when corporations are charged with crimes and they pay the
attorneys fee of counsel representing their employees. The fee arrangement can be inquired
into by the court, but it is insulated from true scrutiny because the defendant can waive any
objection. The defendant, however, may not be fully aware of how the attorney may sacri-
fice his interests in order to protect the absent third party who pays the fee. See Roman M.
Roskewycz, Third Party payment of Criminal Defense Fees: What Lawyers Should Tell Po-
tential Clients and Their Benefactors Pursuant to (An Amended) Model Rule 1.8, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 573 (1993).
42. Professor Lushing argues that defense lawyers would not necessarily be driven into
unethical behavior to collect a contingent fee if such fees were allowed in criminal represen-
tation. Lushing posits that the desire to "win" is more important than money as a motivator.
Lushing, supra, note 29. It may be the case that personalities that thrive on "winning" may
be attracted to the legal profession, but the historical record suggests that when defense at-
torneys are pushed beyond merely winning to winning by corruption that a substantial finan-
cial incentive must be present.
Without a financial incentive, prosecutors apparently sometimes engage in questionable
ethical conduct in order to secure a conviction. However, absent irrational, invidious factors,
such as racism, modulating such conduct, prosecutors are often motivated by what they be-
lieve is a "higher public good"-namely preventing a dangerous person from escaping con-
viction. Defense attorneys overwhelmingly represent persons who have committed a crime.
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A basic tenet of a society maintaining tolerance of and support for
lawyers representing persons charged with crime is that we believe in
the moral independence of the lawyer from the client. The client is
charged with or has committed the crime. The lawyer was not involved
in the crime-he or she only supplies representation. That representa-
tion should not be taken to signal support for the client's past actions-
only support for the due process right to a fair hearing.
This tenet of moral independence is easier to accept and support
under two circumstances. The first circumstance requires that there be
no incriminating material-physical or documentary "evidence"-of
the offense under the control of the defense counsel. Even if it would
incriminate their clients, lawyers have an obligation to turn over to the
prosecuting authorities the instruments of crimes if they come into pos-
session of such instruments or gain knowledge of their whereabouts.43
Moreover, lawyers are prohibited from participating in foisting perjured
testimony on the courts or foisting deliberately misleading information
on regulatory bodies.' The second circumstance requires that the of-
fense be clearly an event in the past, and not a continuing offense. In
such a circumstance, an attorney enters the scene only at the point
where representation on a charge is necessary, because he or she was
not available to provide support before or during the commission of the
offense.
It is highly unlikely that the above conditions for the claim of
"moral independence" exist when one looks carefully at highly paid
lawyers representing alleged organized crime figures or corporations
that may be actively continuing allegedly criminal conduct. Many law-
yers doing criminal defense work actively press their clients to tell them
whether they committed the offense, and if they did, the full scope of
their activity. This is crucial in assuring that the lawyer is fully prepared
for all of the lines of proof that the prosecutor may develop.
In the organized crime context and in most instances in the corpo-
Therefore, they generally have no concomitant "higher public good" to pursue that may be
relied upon to rationalize unethical behavior.
43. See, eg., State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964). For a full discussion of the
rule, see Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the 5th Amendment: The Need for a Projected
Privilege, 1991 DUKE LJ. 572 (1991).
44. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility bars a lawyer from knowingly using
perjured testimony or false evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D.R. 7-102 (A)(4) (1980). The Model Rules require the lawyer to disclose any perjury that a
client intends to commit or has committed. Id Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1996). See also, Donald
Liskov, Note, Criminal Defendant Perjury: A Lawyer's Choice Between Ethics, the Constitu-
tion and the Truth, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 881 (1994).
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rate context, if the client made full disclosure to the attorney, that at-
torney must have access to much of the physical or documentary evi-
dence by which the crime was committed. The attorney would also
have an ethical and legal obligation to turn such evidence over to the
prosecutor. One scholar writing about the defense of white collar cor-
porate crime claims that attorneys do precisely the opposite-they work
actively to prevent the prosecutor from getting access to incriminating
documents. ' Moreover, major law firms servicing corporate clients
have sometimes participated in lodging deliberately misleading infor-
mation with regulatory bodies.4' In the rare cases in which an attorney
observed his ethical obligation to turn over incriminating evidence, or
threatened to report planned perjury by a client, the lawyers were as-
signed counsel who had no financial ties to the client. 47
If lawyers retained by members of organized crime groups get full
disclosure, they then know of their past criminal activity of drug traf-
ficking, murder, hijacking and extortion. It is fairly difficult to believe
that the lawyers-even those who are not manipulated by organized
crime-do not know that their clients are continuing their involvement
in or supervision of such criminal activity during the defense of the
charges. Indeed, mobsters have regularly continued their supervision of
organized criminal activity even while they are imprisoned.4 Is it only
privately retained criminal practitioners who are unaware of how or-
ganized crime functions? Lawyers have an obligation to represent de-
45. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5 (1985) ("But above
all, and this is the central theme of the white-collar crime defense function, defense attorney
works to keep potential evidence out of government reach by controlling access to informa-
tion.").
46. See George N. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICS 637, 665-77 (1994) (canvassing charges against two nationally-
known law firms).
47. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); see also People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46
(Cal. 1981) (involving a lawyer who turned over incriminating evidence). In Nix, the lawyer
actively warned a defendant in a criminal case that he would not tolerate the defendant put-
ting on perjured testimony and that, if he attempted to do so, the attorney would report it to
the court. Nix, 475 U.S. at 161. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant
had no right to insist on unethical behavior from his lawyer, and thus had no claim that he
had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 171. This was the first time the Court
had to decide this issue and the lawyer who acted in such a principled and ethical manner was
an appointed counsel with no financial tie to the defendant.
48. See 20 Arrested in Suspected NE Drug Ring, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1996, at B2
(recounting how Rayful Edmond, a convicted drug kingpin, continued to direct the drug ring
from federal prison); Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Jury Convicts Eight as Members of Mob
Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1986, at Al; Selwyn Raab, Wanted- A Mob Boss Without
the Flash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992, at A25.
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fendants on past criminal offenses-they cannot support in any way the
commission of ongoing or future criminal offenses.49 Lawyers have, if
not a legal obligation, a moral obligation to dissuade a client from
committing offenses in the future and a clear ethical obligation to report
to the authorities when they learn that their client poses a risk of physi-
cal injury to another individual.- Even corporate attorneys may be rep-
resenting clients who are continuing activities that pose a risk of physi-
cal injury, such as violations of environmental regulations or work-
safety health measures." How many privately retained lawyers who re-
ceive high fees to represent organized crime figures or major corpora-
tions are fulfilling this moral obligation to dissuade their clients from
prospectively engaging in criminal activity?
What would happen if all defendants appointed counsel that was
compensated solely by the state? If the person or corporation was in-
nocent-nothing would be different. The innocent defendant would
benefit from full disclosure of all of the facts to his appointed counsel.
If the defendant had committed the offense, he might elect not to make
full disclosure to his or her lawyer. His defense might be hampered, but
solely because he elected not to make full disclosure. We could, how-
ever, be more certain that defense counsel would fully discharge his
ethical obligations to the court, and give the defendant only that to
which he was entitled-an honest defense.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Serious questions remain as to whether legislation designed to pre-
clude any defendant from retaining private counsel would be a violation
of due process under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, or a viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment which guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(d) cmt. (1996).
50. See id. Rule 1.6 (permitting a breach of the attorney-client privilege to prevent a
client from committing a crime that could cause "death or substantial bodily harm").
The context of corporate activity may present a more complex picture. The illegality of
white collar crimes, like anti-trust or environmental violations, may not present as stark and
clear a picture of physical danger as the crimes usually engaged in by organized crime
groups, such as the Mafia. On the moral issue, however, when the corporate criminal activity
is not fraught with any ambiguity and is known to the lawyer, the privately retained lawyer
confronts the same ethical problem as those who represent mobsters.
51. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal
Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 753 (1987); Note, Getting Away With
Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents,
101 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1987).
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of Counsel for his defence."5 2 The questions in constitutional terms
could be more concretized. First, is the negotiation of a prevailing mar-
ket fee arrangement with an lawyer an essential component of the due
process right to a hearing, thereby protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments? Second, does the limitation of all defendants to
state appointed counsel deprive those defendants who can afford pri-
vately retained counsel of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment?
Some light is shed on the due process issue in the case of Walters v.
National Association of Radiation Survivors.3 In Walters, the Court up-
held the constitutional validity of a federal statute that barred any at-
torney from charging a client more than $10 to process a claim for death
or disability benefits before the Veteran's Administration. ' The ap-
pellees asserted that they had a due process right to retain and pay
counsel whatever they choose in order to obtain representation. The
majority rejected the lower court's finding that the statute was exces-
sively "paternalistic." On the contrary, the court found one factor sup-
porting the constitutionality of the fee limitation was that it protected
the Veteran claimants from excessive attorney fee arrangements which
could substantially undermine the goal of preserving an adequate re-
covery to a Veteran for a proven disability. One goal of the legislation
proposed here is to protect middle-class defendants who are generally
in a weak bargaining position, in negotiating attorney fees in the private
market. Moreover, substantial attorneys' fees disrupt the structured
statutory outcome in criminal cases, no matter what the result. If a de-
fendant is acquitted and he has paid an attorney's fee, he has had in ef-
fect been forced to pay an unrecoverable "fine."55 If the defendant is
convicted and put on probation, or given a jail term, he is also assessed
on top of those penalties in effect a "fine," unlike the indigent who has
appointed counsel. Moreover, since the State currently maintains no
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
54. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1988) amended by 38 U.S.C. §5904 (Supp. 1991). Under Sec-
tion 5904 attorney fees are allowed in the representation of a direct appeal to the Court of
Veterans Appeals ("CVA") with two limitations: (1) the lawyer must disclose the fee ar-
rangement to CVA, and CVA is authorized to reduce a fee deemed to be excessive or unrea-
sonable; and (2) contingency fees which are to be paid by the Veterans Administration are
limited to 20% of the award. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904 (1994); see also, Barton F. Stichman, The
Impact of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act on the Federal Circuit, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 855,
867-68 (1992).
55. See Lushing, supra note 29 (noting that defendants who are acquitted, in most cir-
cumstances, have no claim for reimbursement of attorney's fees).
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control over this additional penalty, it now varies from defendant to de-
fendant, even for those acquitted or convicted of identical crimes. It
should not be a violation of due process of law for the State to do away
with the unequal imposition of additional penalties, which impairs its
control over sentencing of those convicted or which prevents it from
neutralizing penalties being imposed on truly innocent persons.
It is to be noted that the proposed legislation is similar to the statute
in Walters-claimants were not formally barred from being represented
by counsel or the equivalent of counsel. In fact, the overwhelming ma-
jority of Veterans claimants was represented free of charge by service
representations supplied by Veterans organizations. Such representa-
tions, some of whom were lawyers, were experienced in VA regula-
tions.56 Moreover, any attorney could represent a claimant, as long as
he or she did not charge more than a $10 fee. Therefore, Walters may
hold that when individuals have regular access to representation in gov-
ernment controlled proceedings, the government may reinforce such
non-profit representation by barring substantial attorney fee arrange-
ments; such a limitation does not deprive individuals of their right to
due process of law.5
The due process claim and Walters (a restriction on counsel in a civil
case) are less significant on the issue of the constitutionality of the leg-
islation proposed here than the Sixth Amendment claim which directly
implicates the right to counsel in criminal cases. A response to the
Sixth Amendment question requires an examination of the precise his-
tory that led to its adoption. Prior to the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment in the American colonies, the English practice was to for-
mally bar any defendant from access to counsel when that defendant
was charged with a felony. At this time, there was some fear that the
enemies of the King were too strong, and that it was necessary to
56. In Walters, the court cited a study by the Veterans Administration that found that
86% of claimants were represented by lawyers who were supplied free of charge by veterans
organizations. Walters, 473 U.S. at 312 n.4.
57. Walters does not speak to the proposed legislation here. In fact, the Walters court
found that the processing of claims was designed to be non-adversarial and supportive of the
claimants. The court also found that it generally does not involve complex legal issues. Id. at
333. Under these circumstances, there was less of a need for full-fledged representation by a
lawyer in processing the average claim. However, the Court acknowledged that a small per-
centage of cases might entail an appeal that could present more complex legal questions.
Nevertheless, the Court did not find that the claimants had to have a substantial fee ar-
rangement to ensure due process because of the steady supply of free representation coming
from the veteran's organizations. The Court also rejected First Amendment claims based on
the denial of the right to petition government. See id.
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strengthen the hand of the King's prosecutors. Also, the prosecution of
many crimes with the exception of treason, were initiated by one private
party against another. 8 The colonists were establishing a new nation in
resistance to a strong central authority, like the King. They desired to
expand the protections that citizens had against such a central authority,
and granting access to counsel in criminal cases was one means of ac-
complishing that end. Moreover, the colonists had moved more toward
the use of a legally trained public prosecutor, and thus saw the need for
some counterweight for the defendant. It is also clear, however, that
the focus during this period was on removing the absolute English bar
to the presence of defense counsel. There was no attempt to assure that
a defendant would always have a financial relationship with defense
counsel. Throughout the Colonies during early English rule, there were
some strong constitutional prohibitions on paying for legal counsel.59
Also, in 1790, Congress passed a statute that imposed a duty on the
courts to assign counsel to represent the accused in capital cases.' Ap-
pointment of counsel was made available to any defendant upon re-
quest without any inquiry into the defendant's capacity to pay for coun-
sel. The goal was the provision of representation for all (including the
rich miser who could refuse to retain counsel) when the defendant faced
an extreme penalty, such as death. Thus, the colonists did not see a fi-
nancial link between the defendant and his counsel (or financial hold of
the defendant over his counsel) as constitutionally mandatory.
There are cases that recognize the Sixth Amendment as protecting a
defendant's right to hire his or her own counsel.6' Such statements are
only dicta with respect to the constitutionality of the proposed legisla-
tion here. They are all made in a context that there were only two ways
in which one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be honored: (1)
appointed counsel for indigents, and (2) retained counsel for all others.
None of these cases can stand for the proposition that it is unconstitu-
tional for all defendants in criminal cases to be limited to state ap-
58. Counsel was always permitted for defense of misdemeanors. The King may have
had a financial incentive for disabling a felony defense because only in felony convictions
could the King share in a fine imposed on the defendant. In 1688, defense counsel was first
allowed in cases of treason. It was not until 1836, however, that counsel was permitted for all
felonies. See HELLER, supra note 2 at 1, 10.
59. See HELLER, supra note 2, at 18-19.
60. See HELLER, supra note 2, at 110.
61. See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370 n.19
(1985) ("They [appellees] simply want to exercise their rights to choose, to consult, and to
employ the services of legal counsel ... a right that should be unfettered in a free society.").
In all criminal proceedings, this right is expressly protected by the Sixth Amendment.
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pointed counsel because no jurisdiction has adopted that posture.
In a more refined sense, the Sixth Amendment question may focus
on the following: What interests are served by permitting a defendant to
hire counsel? Are those interests sufficiently served by the appoint-
ment of counsel? Are there countervailing interests of the State and
the public at large that should take precedence over the defendants' in-
terests, without compromising his or her fundamental right to a fair
trial?
From one perspective, it is difficult for a defendant to claim that he
or she is being "deprived" of anything because the proposal here is to
provide counsel and to relieve the defendant of financial burden that he
or she now bears. However, one interest that may be jeopardized is the
liberty to choose a lawyer in whom the defendant will have confidence.
One response to this problem is that the use of one's resources to
obtain counsel does not mean that one has an unfettered right to choose
counsel . Naturally, a defendant has no right to demand representation
by a person who is not formally admitted to the bar. A defendant can
be forced to retain other counsel if his preferred attorney is not imme-
diately available due to illness or a conflicting trial schedule (and the
trial court finds that waiting would unreasonably delay completing the
trial).Y A trial court may refuse to allow an attorney, retained by the
defendant, from serving if the court finds a potential conflict of interest
between the defendant and others who are currently represented by
that attorney. The court can maintain that stance even if the defendant
is so insistent on obtaining a particular attorney that he or she offers to
waive the right to make a subsequent objection on conflict of interest
grounds.'
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on an issue that is tan-
gential to the issue discussed here, namely whether a federal statute
that indirectly constricts the defendant's ability to have a personal fi-
nancial relationship with counsel is constitutional. In Caplin & Drys-
dale v. United States,' the defendant asserted that the government vio-
62. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 493-94
(student ed., West Publ'g Co. 1985) (citing cases to support the claim that "[a] defendant's
right to retained counsel obviously includes the right to select counsel of his choice, but that
right is not absolute.").
63. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (refusing to sustain a defendant's claim
that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court refused to grant
a continuance so that the defendant could be represented by the attorney of his choice).
64. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
65. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
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lated the Sixth Amendment when it seized financial assets that he
would have used to hire counsel of his choice. The statute allowed the
prosecutor to seek forfeiture of the defendant's assets with proof that
they were the direct or indirect product of criminal activity.66 The court
held that there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel because defendant's assets were properly subject to forfeiture.
Counsel for the defendant made the refined argument that the Sixth
Amendment was violated because the sole purpose of the statute was to
disable the defendant from paying his counsel. He elaborated on this
statement by arguing that if the goal was solely to separate the defen-
dant from ill-gotten assets, a forfeiture was not necessary to achieve
that. Such a separation was achieved by the defendant's obligation to
pay attorney fees.67 The majority did not dodge the issue in response. It
quoted from the lower court and expressly acknowledged that one of
the major purposes of the federal legislation was to strip "criminals ...
of their undeserved economic power, and part of that undeserved power
may be the ability to command high-priced legal talent."6
The Court was not squarely confronted with the question presented
by the proposed legislation here namely blocking a defendant from us-
ing any assets, even legitimately held assets, to hire counsel when the
State provides counsel. Moreover, the Court acknowledged the possi-
bility that some might find the government's goal of disrupting a sub-
stantial financial relationship between the defendant and counsel to be
"unsettling." 9 The result, however, is that the Court did not find such a
goal antithetical to the Sixth amendment right to counsel, where the ul-
timate outcome is that the "formerly rich" defendant receives what
most defendants receive-representation by appointed counsel.
The theme that runs through these cases is that the right to retain
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1995) (racketeering forfeitures); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (drug ring
forfeitures). Funds cannot be seized from a third party who engaged in a bona fide transac-
tion with the defendant and who was reasonably unaware that the funds were subject to for-
feiture. The prosecutor, however, must allege in the indictment that the defendant's assets
are subject to forfeiture. Thus, a lawyer engaged by the defendant is put on notice about the
cloud over the property. The trial court has the authority to freeze the assets that are the
subject of the indictment prior to trial in order to prevent them from being used to pay legal
fees. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (e)(1)(A). Such assets may be recovered from defense counsel after a
conviction.
67. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629.
68. Id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637, 649 (4th Cir. 1988)).
69. See id. See also, Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and
CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid it,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765 (1989).
[Vol. 81:47
ALL DEFENDANTS, RICH AND POOR
the counsel of one's choice is constrained if other important, overriding
values or interests are served, and the defendant is not seriously com-
promised in his capacity to secure an alternative and adequate form of
defense. The Court's view is captured most succinctly in Wheat v.
United States:
Thus, while the right to select and be represented by one's pre-
ferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the
essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective ad-
vocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer who he
prefers.70
[T]he right to counsel "does not override the broader societal in-
terests in the effective administration of justice ... or in the
maintenance of 'public confidence in the integrity of our legal
system.' ,
,71
The public interests served by state appointed counsel for all defen-
dants are implied in the earlier parts of this Article. Such a system
would ensure the appearance and the actuality of equal treatment of all
defendants, especially those who do not at present qualify for legal aid.
We are now in the anomalous position in which the State is constitu-
tionally barred from imposing court costs on a person who is acquitted,'
but it is not obligated to reimburse such a person for the cost of counsel.
The spectacle of the "million-dollar" fees and the wealthy defendants
buying their way out of a conviction would come to an end. It would
deter the recruitment of attorneys into corrupt activity designed to im-
properly thwart a conviction. Present law allows the seizure of assets
traceable to the defendant's criminal activity to bar their use for de-
fense. However, it may not always be possible for the prosecutor to
identify all of the defendant's resources that are the product of criminal
activity. Organized crime syndicates, in particular, are active in
"laundering" illegal gains and stashing their criminal proceeds in seem-
ingly "legitimate" businesses.73 An absolute ban on purchasing counsel
wholly prevents the injustice of defendants obtaining a better quality
defense solely because they have been more manipulative and decep-
70. 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
71. Id. at 158 n.2 (quoting In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F. 2d 604, 611 n.16 (11th Cir. 1986).
72. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (holding that a state statute that sought
to impose court costs upon an acquitted defendant was vague and arbitrary). Justices
Stewart and Fortas, each concurring separately, thought that any imposition of court costs
upon an acquitted defendant was a violation of due process. l at 405.
73. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 40, at 11, 28,35,37.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tive in hiding the proceeds of their crime. These are substantial protec-
tions of the public and improvements in the administration of justice.
They should justify remitting all defendants to the same process for re-
ceiving counsel. These protections preclude any violation of the Sixth
Amendment.
IV. IMPEDIMENTS To ENFORCEMENT
It is possible that even if such statutes were passed, some defendants
may illegally attempt to pay appointed counsel in order to effectuate
the same allegiance that some retained counsel now have. We know,
for example, that some attorneys who represented convicted mobsters,
in order to evade payment of income taxes, did not report their full in-
come from fee arrangements to the Internal Revenue Service. One de-
terrent to this problem would be to make any illegal payments to ap-
pointed counsel by the defendant or others on behalf of the defendant.74
As such an attorney who took such fees would be subject to not only a
jail sentence, but disbarment.
However, we must be realistic and ask searching questions before
we criminalize what would, in effect, be consensual activity because the
criminal law has failed to control other forms of consensual activity such
as drug use or the frequenting of prostitutes.75 We must ask whether the
goal to be achieved is worth the additional policing and surveillance
that may be entailed. While there are similarities between the consen-
sual activities of selling drugs and sex and the bribery offense proposed
here,76 there are significant differences. There are strong arguments
that decriminalizing both drug use and prostitution could be the best
way to control the negative and socially destructive side effects of both
activities." The current "fee for defense" regime, however, has numer-
ous negative consequences which may only be controlled by prohibiting
the financial relationship altogether. Moreover, in the drug and prosti-
tution scenes, the purchaser may be driven by physiologically or sexu-
74. Note that the federal statute that prohibited payment of more than $10 to lawyers,
criminalized the receipt of more money. 38 U.S.C. § 5905 (1994).
75. See, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR
(1993) (detailing the failure of the criminal law to inhibit drug importation and use)
[hereinafter DUKE & GROSS].
76. The hallmark of trafficking in drugs and prostitutes is the presence of highly moti-
vated buyers and sellers who have great incentives for secrecy. That would be present in the
circumstance of a wealthy defendant who would be highly motivated to "buy" more activ-
ity-legal and illegal-from a lawyer who anticipated quickly earning large profits.
77. See Laurie Shrage, Prostitution and the Case for Decriminalization, DISSENT, Spring
1996, at 41-45; see also, DUKE & GROSS, supra note 75, at 231-49.
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ally-based needs. Such needs produce a form of irrationality, which re-
sists the deterrent effect of formal penalties. s In the case of the
"bought-attorney," we are dealing with two "rational actors"-one is
trying to buy his way out of jail, the other is willing to selfishly exploit a
powerful professional position for material gain and the power therein.
This is the kind of motivation that ought to be subject to surveillance
and heavy penalties.
In any event, there is always the prospect of desperate, wealthy de-
fendants who will seek to circumvent the restriction on paying counsel.
One response is to structure the appointment of counsel in such a man-
ner as to disrupt patterns which enhance the possibility of bribery. In
the organized crime context, the organization would often require long-
term and regularized access to the attorney appeared necessary so that
he or she could be "tested" for "cooperation." In order to preclude
such a phenomena, assignment of counsel would be governed by some
visible and predictable method, such that it could not be manipulated,
even by a judge.79 The fact that an attorney had represented a defen-
dant on a previous occasion would be a disqualifier for representation
of that defendant in the future, unless it was a retrial of a reversed con-
viction. The only permissible bias would be that defendants of substan-
tial resources would more likely be assigned representation by the pub-
lic defender rather than by counsel who was simultaneously engaged in
private practice. It would be easier to monitor the public defender's in-
come for improper payments. Unlike assigned counsel, public defend-
ers are typically prohibited from engaging in outside practice (which
could be used as a cover for under cover payments). Their salaries are a
matter of public record, and expenditures far beyond that salary may be
more visible, and easily traced. Fortunately, inquiries about attorney
fee arrangements are generally not shielded by the attorney-client
privilege." Not all states or jurisdictions have a public defender system,
78. The two activities continue despite the fact that the immediate or long-term inter-
ests of the purchaser may be in jeopardy. The drug purchaser runs the risk of a painful ad-
diction or death due to overdose. The purchaser of illicit sex must have contact with a class
of females who are disproportionately infected with AIDS and who may act as a decoy for a
robbery.
79. Reports on organized crime have demonstrated efforts to corrupt judges and other
law enforcement officials. See supra note 40, at 221-22,224,228-29,242-48.
80. See Clark v. American Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1992); In re
Grand Jury Matter (Doe), 926 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Criminal Investigation No.
1/242Q, 602 A.2d 1220 (Md. 1992). Courts have barred inquiries into fee arrangements only
when such inquiries involve disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications. See
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-
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and such systems may be rare in less populated, rural areas. However,
organized crime syndicates, major corporations, and the very wealthy
are likely to be located in major metropolitan areas where public de-
fender systems exist.
No private attorney would be permitted to "volunteer" to represent
the defendant without charge. This is designed to prevent defendants
from covertly attempting to circumvent representation by the public de-
fender. The only exception would be for attorneys who were members
of an organization that had regularly and consistently provided non-
profit legal aid for a specified period of time prior to the passage of leg-
islation that would limit the choice of counsel.8' Newly formed organi-
zations would have to establish their right to function as non-profit legal
aid organizations and operate at least five years with the public de-
fender as co-counsel before they would be allowed to "volunteer" to
handle cases alone. Naturally, the provision of counsel would have to
be consistent with the stated law reform goals of the organization. No
defendant could be defended by an organization to which he had made
a substantial financial contribution.
It is not possible to wholly block wealthy persons or corporations
from having access to advice from retained counsel prior to an arrest or
an indictment. Therefore, persons with great financial resources, unlike
most of the public, would continue even under the proposed plan to re-
tain counsel to advise them as to what is criminal and what is not. Thus,
corporations will still have access to retained attorneys to assist them in
finding "loopholes" to achieve their goals. Mob bosses will still have re-
tained attorneys who assist them in incorporating banks through which
to launder their ill-gotten gains. While this is not desirable, the contin-
ued access to private counsel would support the constitutionality of the
proposed legislation. A court favoring the legislation could point to the
fact that it does not wholly prevent private citizens from access to re-
Requena (DeGeurin) 913 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d
1485 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceeding Cherney, 898 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1990).
Whenever a public defender represents a defendant with substantial wealth, he or she may
be subjected to scrutiny to ensure that no improper financial relationship develops.
81. This exception is designed to accommodate organizations like the American Civil
Liberties Union, or the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, which may be con-
cerned with appropriate development of the law in particular directions (Le., protecting civil
liberties or opposing the death penalty). Indeed, it is possible that a criminal case could be
characterized as a vehicle for advancing the interests of a group and that the right to legal
counsel of one's choice may be protected by the First Amendment. See Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); but cf. Walters v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (upholding a statute barring the cli-
ent from paying substantial fees to an lawyer against First Amendment challenges).
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tained counsel with regard to criminal matters.
V. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
I will not attempt to answer fully the question which any reader
must have at this point-namely, "Yeah, it's a great idea, but how in the
world could it ever be passed?" I readily admit that the current political
environment would be extremely hostile to any proposal to expand
governmental responsibility. This is, after all, the era in which major
players in both political parties trumpet downsizing "Big Government."
This Article is written, however, precisely because the current at-
mosphere is so hostile to the notion that we can expand government re-
sponsibilities in ways that are creative and more responsive to the pub-
lic interest. The dream must come before any action may be taken to
achieve it. I also believe that the notion that the American public is im-
placably "Anti-Big-Government" is not an accurate reading of the ex-
isting political temperament. Americans do not want to do away with
Social Security, although that is one of the largest government pro-
grams. They merely want it to be solvent and able to provide the kind
of security that most citizens have come to expect. Americans do not
want to wholly "privatize" public police forces-they merely want the
police to be able to function efficiently so as to enhance safety. Fur-
thermore, Americans are not wholly uncomfortable with the notion that
restraints on the private sector may be necessary when the license is
abused to produce inequality and unfairness. One needs only look more
carefully at the enduring theme which underlies the long-standing pub-
lic suspicion of the legal profession. At its core, is the notion that jus-
tice before the law, particularly criminal law, is a public good and access
to it should not depend on financial resources. It should be fairly easy
to explain to a disheartened American public that the "purchased" out-
come in a criminal trial is not tolerable.
Moreover, while the general public may not get concerned about the
potential for private lawyers to exploit persons charged with crimes
those in the profession should be concerned. The "jokes" about the le-
gal profession are not "jokes" according to us. We cannot sustain the
public's confidence if they know that we are the only vehicle for crimi-
nal justice but see us as fee-hungry predators. Too many members of
the "respectable" bar avoid criminal practice, and thus we know that no
"free market" operates in this arena. Major bar associations (other
than the criminal defense bar) should, therefore, support the proposals
made here.
While these proposals may seem radical, they may simply be an-
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other logical step in the process of constructing a rational, just way of
administering criminal justice. Throughout American history the direc-
tion of the criminal justice system has been toward expanding the finan-
cial responsibility of government and reducing the arbitrary role that pri-
vate money and private initiative can play, in order to enhance public
control over public safety and provide equal access to justice.
The early colonists moved from the English system in which private
parties instituted prosecutions against other private parties toward the
institution of a public prosecutor." Thus, victims were relieved of the
cost of pursuing those who had wronged them. Gradually, we moved
from self-help vigilantism to undertaking the cost of a well-equipped
and trained police force. Indeed, after all states had undertaken the
full cost of prosecution, the Supreme Court progressively required all
states to absorb certain costs connected with the defense of criminal
charges involving indigents. The state must absorb the cost of the filing
fee attached to a habeas corpus action;3 the cost of filing a notice of di-
rect appeal and securing a transcript; 4 the cost of defense counsel when
an indigent defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor that
can carry a jail sentence;" and the cost of expert psychiatric witnesses
when necessary."
In summary, the state now bears all the costs of criminal prosecution
(district attorneys, police, judges, bailiffs, coroners, etc.) and all of the
necessary costs for the defense of criminal charges against indigents.
Moreover, approximately 75% of the persons processed through the
criminal justice system qualify for public defender representation."'
This proposal may not be opposed openly by wealthy defendants
because they are not organized and the plea of a right to a special
privilege would be shouted down. There are three groups that may op-
82. HELLER, supra note 2, at 21.
83. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961).
84. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252,258 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
85. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (right to appointed counsel for indigents exists
in misdemeanor cases in which the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates Sixth Amendment, requiring States to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in felony cases); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (Sixth Amendment requires
appointed counsel for indigents in federal felony cases).
86. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). There are other ways in which we have
sought to neutralize money as a factor in decision making in the criminal process. A State
must have alternatives for pre-trial release other than money bail, or it might be subject to a
claim denial of equal protection for indigents. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
87. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1733 n.17.
(1993).
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pose the proposal-organizations of criminal defense attorneys, public
officials concerned about the additional cost to the state, and civil liber-
ties organizations.
The private criminal defense bar would have trouble being taken se-
riously because they have an obvious financial stake in the status quo.
They might, however, try to couch their objections in the language of
protecting their client's "rights," as plaintiffs' lawyers have done when
tort reform suggestions are made. However, plaintiffs' attorneys in the
personal injury bar can at least claim that their contingent fee arrange-
ments preserve the capacity for poor and middle-class persons to obtain
access to the courts. Since there is no arrangement in the criminal law
whereby the lawyer for a defendant collects a fee from "the other side,"
criminal practitioners can make no claim that they are serving the entire
public. The criminal defense bar might not want to be too visible in a
debate of the proposal here for it might incite demands for more public
disclosure of the level of their fees.8
With respect to public officials, the answer is that the cost should
not be overwhelming because it would entail providing counsel only for
the small minority of defendants who are not now provided counsel as
indigents."' Indeed for a jurisdiction, like the District of Columbia, it
would be an even smaller step because they now underwrite the cost of
counsel for defendants who can afford to pay only a part of the coun-
sel's fee.' ° Moreover, legislation has passed the House of Representa-
tives which moves part of the way toward the goal proposed here. The
legislation would require the government to pay the legal costs of per-
sons who are acquitted.9' This legislation was proposed by a Republi-
can, and overwhelmingly supported by a Republican-dominated
88. Criminal lawyers cannot claim that they are being shut out of the only kind of law
they practiced because they can always take cases as assigned counsel or join a public de-
fender office. It would be too embarrassing for these lawyers to claim that they would not be
as zealous in defense of their clients unless they were paid high fees because this would con-
tradict their professional obligation.
89. The group that is not absolutely indigent-that should still qualify for representa-
tion by a public defender on constitutional grounds-may be even broader than present prac-
tices suggest. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. See D.C. Indigent Rep. Title III (1996) (providing for partial payment for represen-
tation of appointed counsel, and full absorption of the cost of counsel if the defendant who
originally retained the attorney becomes financially unable to pay the fee).
91. See "House Backs Measure to Pay Legal Costs," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A24
(the Government would be free of the duty to reimburse the defendant if it could prove that,
despite the acquittal the prosecution was "substantially justified or that other special circum-
stances make an award unjust." Amendment to H.R. 2267, as reported by Mr. Hyde of Illi-
nois.)
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House.92 Republicans strenuously avoid the label of being "soft" on
those enmeshed in the criminal justice system, and thus one must con-
clude that they do not believe that this form of public financing of the
criminal defense of non-indigents will not produce a public backlash.
Financing costs should be controllable because federal and state
governments have had no trouble securing competent, dedicated law-
yers at far less than the $250 to $300 per hour that some attorneys
charge in the private sector. It is likely that were the proposal here to
be entertained in a state legislature or Congress, some legislators would
offer an amendment to allow the Government to recover some of the
costs of providing counsel from those who were convicted, and who
could afford it. It might be argued that the government could impose
only reasonable costs on a defendant, without driving innocent mem-
bers of his family into destitution. This would achieve one of the goals
of the proposal because the state would, in effect, have stepped into the
process of bargaining for counsel fees, and corrected for the grossly
unequal power relationship that now exists between the average mid-
dle-class client and private sector criminal defense lawyers. This quali-
fication of the basic proposal treats the Criminal Justice enterprise like
a public bus or rail system. Those who "ride" more, would pay more.
However, I would oppose such an amendment because there is another
value in not imposing a "user" tax in this manner. It would be useful for
us to continue in the direction of treating the whole Criminal Justice in-
dustry as an enterprise to be wholly financed by the public, so that we
can begin to ask hard question about whether we want to use it to re-
spond to every kind of social problem. 9
Civil liberties groups might make two objections. First, that there is
a risk that counsel's legitimate allegiance to his or her client's interests
would be diluted by the fact that he or she is paid by the state. 4 That
might be a legitimate concern, but it is a risk that indigents now face
92. The measure was passed by a vote of 340 to 84. See supra note 91.
93. See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing drug-trafficking and prosti-
tution). An unfortunate by-product of drug trafficking is a concern of this article-it pro-
duces such high profits that there is plenty of money to try to corrupt defense counsel.
94. Paul B. Wice, PRIVATE CRIMINAL DEFENSE, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 13, 42
(William F. McDonald ed. 1983) Wice notes that "[n]o matter how high the quality of a
public defender program, it is still tainted by its relationship to the state. Private criminal
lawyers are therefore the sole vestige of an independent adversary to the state's ability to
indict and convict." Id Some of the studies that have demonstrated little differential per-
formance between public defenders and private counsel for defendants who are not rich sug-
gest that this estimation of superior independent performance is somewhat inflated. Id at
39-64.
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and it is unfair to allow only a handful of defendants to purchase protec-
tion against such a risk. Ultimately, we must rely on the integrity of the
bar that is recruited to serve as defense counsel and the structure that
allows counsel appropriate independence in an adequate defense.
A second claim could be that barring resort to high-priced counsel
would further tip the balance of power toward the prosecutor, who al-
ready has the enormous advantage of the investigative resources of the
police force.9  The best response to this claim is an even further as-
sumption of public responsibility for criminal defense: Defense counsel
should have access to the police force to investigate legitimate leads
that could prove a defendant's innocence, defense counsel should have
authority to take depositions of prospective witnesses (with proper
court supervision), and all criminal laboratory facilities maintained by
the state should be open for use by the defense. The state has as much a
stake in not convicting an innocent person as it does in convicting a
guilty person. The Supreme Court has ruled that a prosecutor has a
constitutional obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence to a defen-
dant when a request is made.96 Why, then, may this obligation not be
extended to the police force to respond to reasonable requests for in-
vestigation in order to uncover exculpatory evidence? The over-
whelming majority of defendants have committed the offense charged
or some variant of the offense charged, as attested to by the 90% to
98% of defendants who plead guilty and the less than 3% who are ac-
quitted at trial. Therefore, the additional investigative burden on the
police should be justified if it is limited to persons who may be innocent.
It is only under a regime of appointed counsel, however, that we could
trust that the requests for investigation would be legitimate and not
generated by privately retained counsel who are attempting to create a
smokescreen.
95. See Luban supra note 87, at 1730. It is to be noted, however, that this imbalance
exists only for the indigent defendant, particularly one who may not be able to make bail and
is unable to conduct his own investigation. The prosecutor has, a formidable task to achieve
a conviction when they are confronted with a wealthy defendant. Such an individual can
more readily take the stand in his own defense since he will usually have no prior criminal
record. Furthermore, a jury may find him more credible because he is armed with a history
of respectability. Prosecutors may have difficulty in prosecuting mob figures because there
may be a code of silence that is reinforced by the threat of assassination.
96. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
97. MILLER, ET. AL., CRIMINAL JuSTICE ADMINISTRATION, 923-24 (4th ed., 1991)
(guilty pleas are at the 90% level for felonies, and 98% if misdemeanors are included).
98. Luban, supra note 87, at 1729. (stating a rate of acquittal for felonies in state courts
at 1% and a rate of 2.8% in federal courts).
99. There should obviously be no disclosure at trial of the defense counsel's requests for
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A most telling point, is that many prosecutors may be trying to
achieve what is proposed here by way of formal legislation. In reliance
on the forfeiture statutes, a prosecutor can tap "virtually all" of a given
defendant's resources as illegally gained and thus force the defendant
into reliance on court-appointed counsel. Such was the case with Pan-
ama's ex-dictator, Manuel Noriega.'O Moreover, private practitioners
who regularly represent wealthy persons who are allegedly involved in
drug trafficking law report that prosecutors have become especially ag-
gressive in investigating and issuing charges against them for improper
involvement with their clients. 1' This obviously can have the impact of
driving some of this high-priced talent into other forms of representa-
tion.l°
VI. HIDDEN AGENDA
Why is such a "high-risk" proposal advanced here? It is because
there is an unidentified agenda. That agenda is to call attention to the
fact that we have all complacently come to tolerate a two-tier system of
justice--one version is overburdened and inadequately financed-and
the other is allowed to freely use its excessive resources, legally and ille-
gally, to overwhelm even the best prosecution. Thus, the spirit of
Gideon regarding the provision of adequate counsel for indigents is
regularly undermined in practice."l
This kind of two-tier delivery of inadequate versus adequate service
characterizes most public institutions when the poor or near poor are
police investigation. One would not want defense counsel to make such inquiries routinely in
order to protect a record should the defendant elect to go to trial. There should be a sepa-
rate unit of the police department that conducts such investigations because one might need
a different temperament and perspective in an investigation to prove innocence.
100. See generally AFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1992) (discussing of how the government deprived Noriega of financial
resources to pay retained counsel).
101. See Harvey Berkman, Zealous Civil Lawyers Now Fear Prosecution, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 30, 1995, at Al. See also William Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781
(1988) (postulating a recent increase in the number of highly paid defense counsel as the
government began to emphasize white collar and drug related offenses and surveying aggres-
sive prosecution tactics to disqualify or conduct intense surveillance of such counsel).
102. One lawyer, who was the subject of the seizure of a $100,000 fee received from an
admitted drug dealer, reported that "more and more good criminal lawyers are leaving this
business." See BERKMAN, supra note 101, at A4.
103. See McDonald, supra note 7, at 8 ("[T]here is a substantial literature suggesting
that publicly supported defense services do not provide justice equal to those which rich de-
fendants receive .... The stagnant national and world economy presages further cutbacks in
defense services and the exacerbation of the existing differentials between the quality of jus-
tice receih 1. by rich and poor American defendants.").
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separated from the upper middle to upper classes. Public schools and
public hospitals are invariably weaker and under-financed in areas
where poor persons live."°4 Police are more aggressive in their efforts to
investigate and suppress crime in upper class neighborhoods. Some of
this occurs because the poor do not have the education, resources, or
sophistication to demand and receive adequate public services. Some
concerned activists and public officials have intelligently attempted to
"integrate" the poor into middle class environments so that they will re-
ceive protective coloration. Hence, the demolishing of huge public
housing projects and special programs to allow lower class persons to
move into middle-class areas have been created.
There are limitations in all of these areas on the extent to which one
can "integrate" the poor with classes above them. There are, for in-
stance, important values served in allowing the development of private
schools alongside public schools. The practice of one's religion or ex-
perimentation with special programs are all positive side effects of al-
lowing persons with superior resources to avoid the public system. Full
residential integration of the different classes is likely to take a very
long time and a large amount of public resources. Moreover, reason-
able arguments can be made that it is not illegitimate .for persons to
have access to more luxuriant surroundings when they have worked
hard and amassed the wealth to do so.
None of those justifications for separation in some areas of our pub-
lic life exist for the public institution of criminal justice. We do not
have to allow the rich to purchase special treatment in the criminal jus-
tice system. The blind-folded figure holding the scales of justice is the
quintessence of criminal law-class differences should not modulate
process or outcomes. There are no special, independent values served
in allowing a small portion of our citizenry to try to "buy" a better out-
come in criminal cases-they have no "right" to such a result. No spe-
cial resources have to be expended to spatially integrate the criminal
justice system. All defendants are tried in the same courts, serviced by
104. 99 Barbara L. Wolfe, Reform of Health Care for the Non-elderly Poor, in
CONFRONTING POVERTY 260 (Sheldon H. Danzinger et. al., 1994) (detailing the withdrawal
of public support from hospitals utilized by the poor).
Public schools are often financed by property taxes, and therefore schools in poorer dis-
tricts receive less money. In San Antonio School Dist V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Court rejected the claim that such a financing scheme denies equal protection of the laws to
the poor. The Court reasoned that education is not a fundamental right and that the plain-
tiffs had not proven that lower levels of financing in some districts had produced poorer
quality education. Some state supreme courts have held that their State Constitution re-
quires equal financing. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1979).
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the same probation and parole officers, and placed in the same jails. All
defendants are investigated by the same police force and prosecuted by
the same United States or District Attorney. Now we must take a small
step to complete the circle and bar anyone from bringing privately re-
tained defense counsel into the process.
There is no more despised group in this country than indigents
charged with crime. They have no political power sufficient to achieve
reform of criminal justice.'0 5 This proposal is a way to recruit the
wealthy into becoming advocates for the improvement of our impover-
ished defense system. Let them explain why they should not be drafted.
105. This is why the major reforms in criminal procedure have occurred at the level of
the United States Supreme Court, an institution designed to protect the politically weak.
However, the Court is constrained in the criminal procedure reforms it can work by the resis-
tance of lower level administrators who may be expressing popular dissatisfaction with the
Court's decisions. For an exploration of that phenomenon, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-71 (1991) (arguing that the formal racial desegregation ordered by
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), has had little impact on the pattern of ra-
cial segregation in schools, because of factors outside the court's control).
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